Nietzsche's hermeneutic significance by Schrift, Alan D.
Nietzsche's Hermeneutic 
Significance 
Alan D. Schrift 
Purdue University 
In the past half-century, philosophers on the 
European continent have, with increasing frequency, 
characterized their investigations as "hermeneutical." 
Both traditional metaphysics and traditional episte-
mology have appeared to be incapable of solving many of 
the problems with which they have struggled since the 
time of Plato. This incapacity is viewed today not as 
the result of faulty solutions; rather, it comes forth 
as a consequence of asking the wrong kinds of ques-
tions. Heidegger's hermeneutics arose out of his at-
tempt to re-think metaphysics and we find contemporary 
hermeneutics speaking of the move beyond epistemology. 
What this hermeneutic challenge to traditional philoso-
phy points to is an emphasis on interpretation rather 
than the traditional pursuit of metaphysical and ep-
istemological foundations upon which to erect a philo-
sophical system. Yet by emphasizing the interpretive 
nature of perception and knowledge, the proponents of 
this view face the following dilemma: how to avoid the 
dogmatic positing of a single correct interpretation 
without lapsing into an unmitigated relativism which, 
in rejecting "correctness" as the interpretive telos, 
is unable to adjudicate between competing interpreta-
tions. This dilemma of dogmatism and relativism, I 
would argue, is the central problem confronting her-
meneutics and can be seen to animate the debates 
between Gadamer and Betti, Gadamer and Habermas, as 
well a& the current controversy between the Heidegge-
rian and deconstructionist approaches to interpreta-
tion. 
Nietzsche's text can perhaps be of assistance in 
arriving at a solution to this dilemma in two distinct 
yet interconnected ways. First, Nietzsche considers 
text as an "object" of hermeneutic inquiry. Few texts 
in the history of philosophy have been the subject of 
such diverse and divergent interpretations as that of 
Nietzsche. Nietzsche's works have been taken as 
providing the philosophical foundations of the Nazi 
master race as well as supplying some of the insights 
upon which a humanistic psychological theory has 
developed. His work is seen as the culmination of the 
Western metaphysical tradition by some and it. is viewed 
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as the first step outside of that tradition by others. 
By critically examining the various interpretive appro-
priations of Nietzsche's text, we may gain some in-
sights into the nature of hermeneutic inquiry and the 
interpretation-text relationship. The second way in 
which Nietzsche can be of assistance is through the 
consideration of Nietzsche's text as the exposition of 
a hermeneutic theory. The phenomenon of interpretation 
is a recurrent theme throughout Nietzsche's writings. 
Within his remarks on interpretation, a tension is pre-
sent which anticipates the current dilemma of dogmatism 
and relativism facing hermeneutic theory. By examining 
Nietzsche's exposition of this tension, a possible 
solution to the current hermeneutic dilemma is sugges-
ted. It is this second issue, Nietzsche's approach to 
interpretation, which will be the subject of the fol-
lowing remarks. 
Within Nietzsche's various comments on interpreta-
tion two central themes emerge. The first is his doc-
trine of perspectiv!sm, which asserts that there are no 
uninterpreted facts. The positivistic notion of a 
"fact-in-inself" (objective Truth) is explicitly rejec-
ted by Nietzsche. Rather, there are only interpreta-
tions, that is, evaluations from a particular perspec-
tive in terms of one's being situated at a particular 
point in space, time and history. This doctrine of 
perspectiv!sm has been characterized alternatively as 
paradoxical, nihilistic, and self-refuting. I would 
argue, however, that these judgments arise from a com-
mon misunderstanding of perspectivism, namely, that the 
doctrine of perspectivism is an ontological position. 
If, on the other hand, we understand perspectivism to 
be an "epistemological" position, one which delineates 
the limits of human perception and knowledge in provid-
ing a description of what we can "know" and not of what 
there "is," we can see that perspectivism is neither 
paradoxical, nihilistic, nor self-refuting. 
When Nietzsche claims that there is no "true world" 
behind the world of appearances, he is not arguing for 
some sort of metaphysical idealism. Instead, he is 
rejecting the "Myth of the Beyond" that he finds at the 
essence of Christian morality as well as Platonic and 
Kantian metaphysics. Nietzsche's perspectivism does 
not question the existence of the world, but ac-
knowledges that human perception and knowledge are 
limited: "We can comprehend only a world that we our-
selves have made." (WP, 495)' This is not just a 
normative claim: it is an empiricial conclusion 
regarding human finitude. There is no knowledge-in-
itself, no Truth with a capital T; there are only 
truths and knowledge-for-us. "That things possess a 
constitution in themselves, quite apart from inter-
pretation and subjectivity is a quite idle hypothesis 
. . . it presupposes that interpretation and subjectiv-
ity are not essential;" (WP, 560) in other words, it 
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presupposes that our "knowledge" of a thing can be 
freed from our perception of it. Nietzsche rejects the 
"thing-in-itself, " "meaning-in-itself," "facts-in-them-
selves" because we have no access to the in-itself, 
because the realm of the in-itself is an "idle hypothe-
sis." For Nietzsche, at the bottom of every "what is 
that?" there always lies "what is that for me?" This 
is to say, we can only learn about the world from the 
questions that we ask, and all questioning is 
perspectival. As such, the answers that we receive 
will be perspectival as well. This is why there is "no 
limit to the ways in which the world can be 
interpreted," (WP, 600) and v/hy also "There is no sin-
gle correct interpretation." (Letter to C. Fuchs, 
August 26, 1888) There are, for all practical pur-
poses, an infinite number of subjects and an infinite 
number of viewpoints. As a result, there are an infin-
ite number of interpretations, that is, perspective 
valuations. 
In apparent opposition to the relativistic doctrine 
of perspectivism, however, are Nietzsche's comments 
regarding philology or "the art of reading well." What 
Nietzsche means by "reading well," however, is not at 
all clear. On the one hand, reading well seems to im-
ply some desire to maintain a sense of textual purity. 
The philologist'8 task is to devise rigorous methods 
for "the restoration and keeping pure of texts." He 
should be guided in this task by "the simple desire to 
comprehend what an author says." (HatH, 270) The worst 
readers, he says, are "those who act like plundering 
soldiers." (MOM, 137) In order to apply "their pro-
found interpretations, they often alter the text to 
suit their purpose--or in other words, [they| corrupt 
the text." (WS, 17) On the other hand, Nietzsche both 
denies any authorial privilege regarding the determina-
tion of textual meaning while at the same time denying 
the fixed, closed character of that textual meaning. A 
poet, he writes, "is absolutely not an authority for 
the meaning of his lines." (Letter to C. Fuchs, August 
26, 1888) The author is continually surprised "at the 
.way in which his book, as soon as he has sent it out, 
continues to live a life of its own." (HatH, 208) 
Elsewhere he writes that "a book is made better by good 
readers." (MOM, 153) For Nietzsche, the text is essen-
tially incomplete, and this incompleteness serves as an 
artistic stimulus and invitation to its audience, (cf 
HatH, 199, 178) The great author incites his audience 
to further investigation and places the demand on his 
readers to complete the work. There is much to be read 
in a text that is not actually written down, writes 
Nietzsche, and the good reader will be the one who has 
not yet "forgotten to think while reading a book: he 
still understands the secret of reading between the 
lines . . . I and reflecting back] upon what he has 
read." (FEI, Preface) The philologist thus finds him-
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self in a precarious position: in his establishing a 
method of strict interpretation (strengen Erklärungs-
kunst 1 with the intention of clearly understanding what 
the text means, he continually runs the risk of no 
longer suspecting what he should take for granted: the 
double and more than double sense of every text. (cf 
HatH, 8) As Nietzsche will later remark regarding the 
text of the world, "we cannot reject the possibility 
that it may include infinite interpretations." (GS, 
374) 
Given this danger of dogmatism inherent in the 
philological enterprise, how are we to interpret 
Nietzsche's remarks regarding philology as the art of 
reading well? The answer is provided, I think, in the 
prefaces which Nietzsche added in 1886-87 to his 
earlier published works. Here we are told what it 
means to read well: "slowly, profoundly, looking back-
ward and forward, with inner thoughts, with the mental 
doors ajar, with delicate fingers and eyes." (D, 
Preface, 5. Translation altered) The philologist is 
to be the teacher of slow reading, the teacher of read-
ing as rumination (Wiederkäuen) upon the text. 
Philology, Nietzsche tells us, teaches its adherents 
the leisurely art and expertise of goldstuithing applied 
to words. Like the goldsmith, who knows the limits of 
his material and yet who forges this raw material into 
ever-new and creative forms, so too the philologist 
knows the limits of the text, he knows when interpreta-
tion becomes violation and corruption and yet he can 
still work and re-work the text, forging ever-novel and 
creative meanings "between the lines." 
By interpreting Nietzsche's doctrines of philology 
and perspectivism as I have suggested, it appears that 
a precursory difficulty to the contemporary hermeneutic 
dilemma of dogmatism and relativism is already in-
scribed within the Nietzschean text. This is to say, 
the perspectival claim that there is nothing other than 
interpretation appears irreconciliable with the philo-
logical presupposition that there is a text which is to 
be kept separate from the interpretations imposed on 
it. What remains to be considered is whether 
Nietzsche's two conflicting interpretive tendencies can 
be understood in such a way as to avoid the noxious 
consequences of both a dogmatic and unmitigated rela-
tivistic approach to interpretation. 
An insight into this matter can be gained from 
Derrida's discussion of the two interpretations of in-
terpretation in "Structure, Sign, and Play in the 
Discourse of the Human Sciences."2 Derrida writes of 
the two interpretations that the one seeks to decipher, 
dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which 
escapes play and the order of the sign, and which lives 
the necessity of interpretation as an exile," while the 
other calls for "the joyous affirmation of the play of 
the world and the innocence of becoming, the affirma-
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tion of a world of signs without fault, without truth, 
without origin which is offered to an active interpre-
tation." For Derrida, these two interpretations of in-
terpretation are irreducible and undecidable: neither 
can be reduced without remainder to a form of its oppo-
site nor can we choose one mode of interpretation and 
dispense with the other. While Derrida labels the for-
mer interpretation as "Rousseauistic" and the latter as 
"Nietzschean," the preceding discussion of philology 
and perspectivism reveals both interpretations of in-
terpretation to be found in Nietzsche's text. Never-
theless, this Derridean insight into the "undecidabil-
ity" of the two interpretations of interpretation will 
be employed in the following elucidation of a 
Nietzschean approach to interpretation. By "undecida-
bility," I take Derrida to mean that the "logic" of the 
two interpretations is not that of an "either . . . or 
. . . " but a "both . . . and . . . " This is to say, 
an approach to interpretation is not faced with an 
either/or choice between rigorous textual attentiveness 
or playful creativity. Nor is an interpretive metho-
dology faced with the demand of reconciling these two 
competing interpretive tendencies in a synthesis or 
Aufhebung, thereby overcoming the conflict between them 
in a higher "unity." Rather, the Nietzschean approach 
will play between these two interpretive motifs, at 
once serious and playful, attentive and creative. "Ich 
bin ein Doppelgänger," Nietzsche writes in Ecce Homo, 
as a cryptic explanation of the multifarious character 
of his experiences and writings. In the same way, the 
interpreter of a text must be a Doppelgänger, with one 
eye turned toward philological rigour and the other 
recognizing the necessarily perspectival character of 
all "knowledge." By remaining attentive to both im-
pulses, the interpreter can account for a multiplicity 
of possible interpretations while avoiding both a rela-
tivistic subjectivism and any sort of dogmatic 
absolutism. Nietzsche himself seems to be able to 
avoid both these alternatives: while maintaining that 
there is no single, correct interpretation, he circum-
vents the charge of subjectivism through his focusing 
on the character of existence as becoming. Although 
the doctrine of perspectivism asserts that there are no 
"facts" or things" but rather only interpretations, 
this is not to assert, however, that everything is sub-
jective, for the subject itself is not something given 
but something invented and added to the process of 
interpretation, (cf WP, 481) "The subject is a created 
entity, a 'thing' like all others: a simplification 
with the object of defining the force which posits, in-
vents, thinks, as distinct from all individual posit-
ing, inventing, thinking as such." (WP, 556) When 
Nietzsche writes, for example, that "One may not ask: 
'who then interprets?'" (WP 556), it is because such a 
question already mislocates the interpretive process. 
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Likewise, one may not ask "what then is interpreted?" 
Interpretation is not grounded in either the subject or 
object; it exists as an active process in the between, 
in the space which separates them, and the attempt to 
focus the interpretive process in the direction of 
either the subject or the object will only serve to ob-
scure the dynamics of this process. The idea of unin-
terpreted existence is for Nietzsche, non-sense (cf. 
GS, 374) and yet the origin of these interpretations is 
not some sort of substantial subject qua reservoir of 
prejudices and preconceptions. Interpretation is, 
rather, the fundamental "epistemological" process, to 
be conceived as the form of will to power and the crea-
tive and procreative impulse to life. In this context, 
philology as the art of reading well takes on a new 
significance. In The Antichrist, Nietzsche notes the 
theologians "incapacity for philology." Here reading 
well signifies "being able to read off a fact without 
falsifying it by interpretation, without losing cau-
tion, patience, subtlety in the desire for understand-
ing. Philology as ephexis funded si veness] in inter-
pretation." (AC, 52) 
In other words, philology's task is to guard 
against teleological interpretations, i.e., those in-
terpretations which are controlled by the desire to un-
derstand something for a specific purpose, as the 
priests have hitherto interpreted the world in such a 
way as to insure their own claims to power. Philology 
as ephexis (the etymological root of the phenomenologi-
cal epoche) must keep the question of interpretation 
open, for there are countless possible interpretations 
and countless possible meanings which will fit a given 
text. 
There is thus no question of choosing between 
philology and perspectivism, as both are required in 
the' ever-ongoing process of interpretation. In fact, 
Nietzsche ultimately situates the interpretive process 
between the two moments of philology and perspectivism. 
The goal of this interpretive process will be a new 
"objectivity," one no longer understood as "contempla-
tion without interest", which for Nietzsche is a "non-
sensical absurdity . . . (grounded upon) the dangerous 
old conceptual fiction that posited a 'pure, will-less, 
painless, timeless knowing subject.'" Instead, this 
"future 'objectivity"' is defined as "the ability to 
control one's Pro and Con and to dispose of them, so 
that one knows how to employ a variety of perspectives 
and affective interpretations in the service of 
knowledge . . . There is only a perspective seeing, 
only a perspective 'knowing ; and the more affects we 
allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, diff-
erent eyes, we can use to observe one thing, the more 
complete will our 'concept' of this thing, our 
'objectivity' be." (CM, Third Essay, 12) A plurality 
of interpretations is, for Nietzsche, a sign of 
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strength, and the master of interpretation or "grand 
stylist" will be he who can endure the greatest mul-
tiplicity of competing and contrary interpretations, 
that is to say, who can organize them into a meaningful 
whole which will enhance his life. 
By focusing upon enhancement of life rather than 
objective Truth as the criterion for judging the value 
of an interpretation, Nietzsche's interpretive approach 
can account for the illegitimacy of certain interpreta-
tions while at the same time avoiding the positing of a 
single interpretation as the correct one. Again, this 
is not so much the result of a normative claim for 
Nietzsche as it is an empirical conclusion. He writes 
that "what is 'incorrect' can be ascertained in innum-
erable cases: what is correct, almost never." (Letter 
to C. Fuchs, August 26, 1888) In other words, it is 
experimentally and experientially possible to discover 
which interpretations are unhealthy: those that negate 
or inhibit the creative and procreative impulse to 
life, i.e., those that inhibit the will to power. And 
for this reason, these interpretations are to be deemed 
inappropriate, illegitimate, or "incorrect." On the 
other hand, the case is not so clearly decidable with 
respect to discerning those interpretations which are 
healthy, i.e., those interpretations which foster an 
increase in the will to power and thus enhance life. 
My point in this discussion, however, is not to weigh 
the relative merits and liabilities of health or life-
enhancement as a criterion for the adjudication of 
interpretations. Rather, it is to show that by adopt-
ing such a criterion, Nietzsche can avoid the dilemma 
of choosing between dogmatism and relativism in his ap-
proach to interpretation. Insofar as health or life-
enhancement is a situation-specific and variable stan-
dard, there can be no single correct interpretation 
which will enhance life or promote health for all in-
terpreters and for all times, and Nietzsche can affirm 
health as a standard without thereby specifying a 
universally applicable criteriology for what is to 
count as healthy or life-enhancing. In so doing, 
Nietzsche allows for a proliferation of acceptable in-
terpretations (thereby avoiding the dogmatic assertion 
of a single "correct" interpretation) while retaining a 
standard by which to distinguish "better" from "worse" 
interpretations (thus avoiding an empty relativism in 
which all interpretations are of equal value). 
By way of conclusion, let me offer a metaphor which 
Nietzsche provides as a clue for understanding how a 
balance is to be achieved between the philological 
rigour which accounts for the "falsity" of some inter-
pretations and the perspectivism which allows for the 
proliferation of a multiplicity of interpretations. In 
Human, All-Too-Human (Section 278), Nietzsche discusses 
the metaphor of dance. Dancing, he writes, is not 
merely the mechanical following of a pattern of steps. 
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Rather, the dancer must possess both strength and 
flexibility. He or she must follow the basic pattern 
of steps, but in following this pattern, the dance is 
created anew, in as fluid and as beautiful a form as 
the dancer is capable of creating. Similarly a good 
reading is not merely the rigorous apprehension of the 
meaning behind a text. Rather, it is an interpretation 
from a particular perspective, determined by the text 
to which the reader responds and by what the reader 
brings to the text in conjunction with the reader's 
capacity to create. A textual interpretation will be 
as strong and as supple, as creative and as appropriate 
as the interpreter is him- or herself. Interpretation 
cannot choose between the dogmatic assertion of one 
meaning and the relativistic acceptance of any meaning. 
Rather, interpretation must play between these two lim-
its, both of which can function only as an end to the 
play. Nietzsche recognized these two alternatives as 
the limits between which the play of interpretation is 
operative, and as such, his hermeneutic approach situ-
ates itself between philology and perspectivism, in the 
between which links methodological rigour and creative 
appropriation. 
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